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Abstract
What are the costs of inflation fluctuations and who bears those costs? In this paper, we in-
vestigate this question by means of a quantitative incomplete-market, heterogenous-agent model
wherein households hold real and nominal assets and are subject to both idiosyncratic labor
income shocks and aggregate inflation risk. A key feature of our analysis is a nonhomothetic
specification for households’ preferences towards money and consumption goods. Unlike tradi-
tional specifications, ours allows the model to reproduce the broad features of the distribution of
monetary assets (in addition to being consistent with the distribution of nonmonetary assets).
Inflation risk is found to generate significant welfare losses for most households, i.e., between 1
and 1.5 percent of permanent consumption. The loss is small or even negative for households
at the very top of the productivity and/or wealth distribution.
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1 Introduction
What are the costs of inflation fluctuations and who bears those costs? In this paper, we investigate
this question by means of a quantitative incomplete-market, heterogenous-agent model wherein
households hold real and nominal assets and are subject to both idiosyncratic labor income shocks
and aggregate inflation risk. To be more specific, the model has the following three main features:
First, households solve an optimal portfolio choice between money and capital claims, subject
to an occasionally binding borrowing constraint. Both assets can coexist in household portfolios
because the lower real return paid by money balances is compensated by the liquidity services that
it provides – as captured by the fact that real money balances affect current utility, in the money-
in-the-utility, or “MIU” tradition.1 This feature is in contrast with existing incomplete-market
models with aggregate shocks, which either abstract for portfolio choices (by considering a single
asset or a menu of perfectly substitutable assets), or focuses on the choice between two real assets
(so that inflation risk does not affect the relative returns of the assets).2
Second, the model is designed to match the cross-sectional distribution of money holdings, in
addition to matching the cross-section of nonliquid wealth. Because our investigation is primarily
quantitative, a prerequisite for a meaningful analysis of the impact of inflation risk on the welfare of
different types of households is that the model match the cross-sectional distribution of monetary
wealth in the first place. We show that this requirement requires departing from the functional form
commonly used to parameterize money demand in monetary models with representative agent.3 As
discussed extensively in Ragot (2014), the empirical cross-sectional distribution of money holdings
in the US is close to that of financial assets and hence very different from that of consumption.4
This property cannot follow from the usual MIU specification, which features a constant elasticity
of substitution between money and goods and hence strict proportionality between the demands
1This tradition goes back at least to Patinkin (1956) and Sidrauski (1967). See Walsh (2010) for a survey of the
flexible-price MIU model under complete markets.
2In such models, when the borrowing constraint is not zero, private bonds are traded next to capital claims,
but the two are usually assumed to be perfect substitutes (see, e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1998). Heathcote (2005)
introduces government bonds next to the capital stock, but again makes the necessary assumptions ensuring that
the two are perfect substitutes. Krusell and Smith (1997) consider the portfolio choice between a real riskless bond
and capital claims. Krusell et al. (2011) and Challe et al. (2013) analyze the portfolio choice between real bonds
(differing by their maturity).
3See, e.g., Chari et al. (1996, 2000).
4For example, Ragot (2014) finds that in the US Gini coefficient for individual consumption levels is 0.54, while
that for money balances is 0.85. In Italy the corresponding figures are 0.30 and 0.68, respectively.
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for money and consumption goods. If this were the case then inequalities in money holdings would
simply mirror inequalities in consumption, which is strongly against the data. We overcome this
limitation of the standard MIU specification by introducing a more general utility function that
nests the constant-elasticity case but also accommodates a non-constant elasticity of substitution,
thereby allowing individual money holdings to vary more than proportionally with individual con-
sumption levels. This utility function allows us to reproduce the broad features of the distribution
of monetary wealth in the US economy, whilst at the same time being consistent with the observa-
tion that, at the individual level, higher wealth is associated with greater absolute money holdings
but lower money holdings relative to total wealth.
Third, the model incorporates as part of the solution households’ rational portfolio response to
the inflation risk that they face. As far as we are aware, existing work on the effect of inflation on
welfare in heterogenous-agent models has focused on the welfare impact of either mean inflation
or unexpected shocks to inflation, leaving aside (by construction) households’ optimal portfolio
response to their expectation of future inflation shocks.5 This dimension is crucial in the present
study for at least two reasons. First, households are likely to respond ex ante to the inflation risk
they are facing, i.e., we expect different levels of inflation risk to generate different mean holdings
of nominal assets; and second, allowing significant redistributive effects of inflation but ignoring
the ex ante portfolio response to inflation risk is likely to overestimate the welfare cost of inflation
shocks.
The model features both aggregate (inflation) and idiosyncratic (labor productivity) shocks and
is calibrated accordingly. Regarding the time-series dimension, we feed the model with an exoge-
nous process for the money growth rate so that the equilibrium response of inflation matches the
volatility properties of actual inflation over the post-Volcker, pre-Great Recession period. Treating
equilibrium inflation (rather than the money supply) as the forcing term in our analysis ensures
that the inflation risk that households face in the model is consistent with the historical inflation
risk. Concerning the cross-sectional dimension, we calibrate the wage income process as well as
5Imrohoroglu (1992) and Erosa and Ventura (2002) study the impact of mean inflation on welfare in incomplete-
market environments. Cao et al. (2012) examine the redistributive and welfare effects of changes in mean inflation
within an overlapping generations model. Similarly, Doepke and Schneider (2006a, 2006b) attempt to evaluate the
redistributive and welfare effects of a moderate but persistent inflation episode in the US economy. They find these
effects to be large, due to the significant degree of heterogeneity in nominal asset positions across US households and
the large fraction of foreign holders of US assets. In the same spirit, Sterk and Teynero (2014) use an overlapping-
generation model to evaluate the impact of open market operations on durables consumption.
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household’s preferences towards money and consumption goods so as to match the joint cross-
sectional distributions of monetary and nonmonetary assets. Our analysis can thus be interpreted
as way to discipline preferences towards money and goods on the basis of the statistical moments
of cross-sectional data on monetary positions.
To evaluate the cost of inflation fluctuations and the way it is distributed across households,
we compute the ex ante welfare of an agent conditional on a particular idiosyncratic state and
portfolio, in economies with and without inflation risk. To summarize, we find significant welfare
costs of inflation fluctuations for all households except for those at the top end of the productivity
scale and/or the wealth distribution. For example, for a low-productivity household holding the
average portfolio of the households with similar productivity (where the “average” is computed
from the invariant distribution of the economy with aggregate risk), full elimination of inflation
risk is equivalent to a 1.5 percent increase in lifetime consumption. We find similar welfare costs
for intermediate productivity households starting with either the portfolio of the average household
with similar productivity or the average portfolio of low-productivity households. While inflation
risk generates no welfare loss (or even a small benefit) for households at the top of the productivity
and/or wealth distribution, the welfare loss for the average household is close to 1 percent of
permanent consumption. Such welfare losses are large: they are one order of magnitude larger
than those computed by Lucas (1987, 2003) in a representative-agent context;6 and about five times
the welfare cost of the business cycle as computed by Imrohoroglu (1989) within a (nonmonetary)
incomplete-market, heterogenous-agent model. The magnitude of the welfare costs that we find
is similar to that in models with incomplete insurance wherein the extent of idiosyncratic risk is
systematically related to the size of aggregate productivity shocks, a channel that is absent from
our model.7
The next section presents the model. Section 3 discusses our parameterization. Section 4
presents our main results on the welfare costs of inflation fluctuations, and Section 5 concludes.
6Lucas’ calculations only rely on the assumption of complete market and a specification for the representative
agent’s preferences. While maintaining complete markets and suitably choosing preferences can generate large welfare
costs of the business cycle, Ostrok (2001) shows that this argument does not survive in general equilibrium wherein
households optimally choose (and effectively smooth) consumption.
7See, e.g., Storsletten et. al. (2001) and Krusell et al. (2009).
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2 The model
The model is a MIU, heterogenous-agent model augmented with i) aggregate shocks to inflation
(driven by underlying changes in money growth), and ii) a nonhomothetic utility functional designed
to accommodate significant dispersion in holdings of monetary assets.
2.1 Preferences
Households are infinitely-lived and in constant mass equal to 1. They share identical and additively
time-separable preferences over sequences of consumption, c ≡ {ct}∞t=0, and real money balances,
m ≡ {mt}∞t=0. Thus, they maximize
U (c,m) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct,mt) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, Et denotes expectations conditional on the
information set at date t, and u is the instant utility function. This function is assumed to take
the following parametric form:
u (ct,mt) =
1
1− λ
(
ωc1−ρt + (1− ω)mθ(1−ρ)t
) 1−λ
1−ρ
, ρ, θ, λ > 0. (2)
When θ = 1, equation (2) becomes a standard homothetic utility function similar to that used by
Chari et al. (1996, 2000) and Algan and Ragot (2010), among others. In this case, the interest-rate
elasticity of real money demand is 1/ρ, while the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption and real balances is (1−ρ)/(λ−ρ). As discussed above, an important limitation of the
homothethic specification is that it implies a strict proportionality between individual real money
holdings and individual consumption levels (for any given values of the nominal interest rate and
the inflation rate). This makes it impossible to reproduce the highly unequal distribution of money
holdings that is observed in US data. Our baseline calibration will thus have θ 6= 1.
2.2 Idiosyncratic uncertainty
In every period, households are subject to idiosyncratic labor income shocks. Labor productivity
can take three different values: et ∈ E, E = {el, em, eh} with el < em < eh, and where eh stands for
‘high productivity’, em for ‘medium productivity’, and el for ‘low productivity’. Each household’s
productivity evolves according to a first-order Markov chain with the 3 × 3 transition matrix F .
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We denote by p∗ the vector of stationary ergodic probabilities and normalize productivity levels so
that the mean of the invariant distribution is one, i.e.,
∑
p∗i ei = 1. Given a population of measure
one, we can interpret p∗ as describing the distribution of the population across productivity states.
It follows that the effective aggregate labor supply is equal to
∑
p∗i ein¯ = n¯, where n¯ stands for
labour hours per period.
2.3 Production
Markets are competitive. In every period t, the representative firm uses aggregate capital Kt ∈ R+
and households’ labor to produce Yt ∈ R+ units of a single good with the aggregate technology
Yt = f(Kt, n¯) = K
α
t n¯
1−α.
Capital depreciates at the constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and accumulates according to the law of
motion
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt. (3)
where It denotes aggregate investment. Perfect competition in the markets for the representative
firm’s inputs implies that the real interest rate, rt, and the real wage, wt, can be written as:
rt = αK
α−1
t n¯
1−α − δ, wt = (1− α)Kαt n¯−α.
2.4 The household’s problem
We assume that markets are incomplete, so that households cannot write insurance contracts
contingent on their labor income. Moreover, they face borrowing constraints and are thus prevented
from using private loans to fully smooth out individual income fluctuations. Each household i
maximizes its expected lifetime utility (1) subject to the following constraints:
cit + k
i
t+1 +m
i
t = a
i
t +
(
1− τ lt
)
wte
i
tn¯, (4)
kit+1 ≥ 0, mit ≥ 0, and cit ≥ 0, (5)
where kit+1 and m
i
t denote the claims to the capital stock and the real money balances held by
household i at the end of date t, and where
ait = (1 + (1− τ ct ) rt) kit +
mit−1
1 + pit
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is the household’s financial wealth at the beginning of date t. In (4) and (5), τ lt and τ
c
t are pro-
portional taxes on labor and capital, respectively. In (5), the presence of the borrowing constraint
is reflected in the fact that capital and money holdings must be nonnegative at all times, while no
other assets (i.e., private bonds) can be issued by the households.
From the households’ objective and constraints, we find that their optimal asset demands, mit
and kit+1, must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
• Money:
uc
(
cit,m
i
t
)− um (cit,mit) = βEt
[
uc
(
cit+1,m
i
t+1
)
1 + pit+1
]
. (6)
• Capital:
Either uc
(
cit,m
i
t
)
= βEt
[
(1 + (1− τ ct ) rt+1)uc
(
cit+1,m
i
t+1
)]
and kit+1 > 0, (7)
or uc
(
cit,m
i
t
)
> βEt
[
(1 + (1− τ ct ) rt+1)uc
(
cit+1,m
i
t+1
)]
and kit+1 = 0.
The instant utility function (2) implies that um
(
cit, 0
)
=∞, so the demand for real balances is
always interior. In contrast, the demand for capital may be corner (i.e., kit+1 = 0), in which case
the household would like to raise current consumption by borrowing against future income but is
prevented from doing so (by a binding borrowing constraint). The solution to the households’ prob-
lem provides sequences of policy functions mt (a, e), kt (a, e) and ct (a, e), (a, e) ∈ R+×{e1, e2, e3},
where a and e denote individual beginning-of-period asset wealth and productivity, respectively.
To better understand the implications of our assumed period utility function with non-constant
elasticity of substitution (i.e., (2)), consider the optimal trade-off between consumption and real
money holdings by an unconstrained household (so that kit+1 > 0 in (7)) and abstract from aggregate
shocks momentarily. From (6)–(7) and the functional form (2), we find the relation between money
holdings and consumption to be:
mit = A ((1− τ ct ) rt+1, pit+1)
(
cit
) ρ
1−θ(1−ρ) , (8)
where A ((1− τ ct ) rt+1, pit+1) is a coefficient whose value depends on the returns on the two assets
and the deep parameters of the utility function. In the constant-elasticity case (i.e., θ = 1), we have
mit = A ((1− τ ct ) rt+1, pit+1) cit, that is, real money demand is strictly proportional to consumption,
so that cross-sectional inequalities in these two variables exactly mirror each other. For individual
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money holdings to increase more than proportionally following an increase in individual consump-
tion, so that money be more unequally distributed than consumption (as is observed in the data),
one needs ρ/ (1− θ (1− ρ)) > 1 (whether θ must lie above or below 1 for this inequality to hold
depends on the value of ρ.)
2.5 Market clearing
Define µt : R+×
{
eh, em, el
}→ R+ as the joint cross-sectional distribution of wealth and individual
productivity at the beginning of period t. The market-clearing conditions for real balances and
capital claims are given by: ∫
mit(at, et)dµ (at, et) = Ω
s
t , (9)
and ∫
kt(at, et)dµ (at, et) = Kt+1, (10)
where Ωst is the total quantity of real balances at date t. By Walras law, the goods market clear
when both the money and the capital markets clear.
2.6 Fiscal and monetary policy
Fiscal and monetary policies interact here because monetary policy generates segniorage revenues
that determine government income jointly with tax collections. We specify both as follows.
First, we assume that inflation follows a two-state Markov chain: the inflation rate transits
between piL and piH > piL according to the transition matrix T . The money growth rate that
produces this inflation process as an equilibrium outcome is determined endogenously. The two
inflation levels as well as the transition probabilities between the two can then be calibrated ac-
cording to historical data. This ensures that the amount of inflation risk faced by the households
in the model is consistent with its historical counterpart.8
For a given inflation process, the growth rate of the quantity of money γt is determined as
follows. First, let ∆t denote the nominal quantity of newly issued money at date t (relative to the
stock of money at the end of date t − 1) and by Πt = Pt/Pt−1 = 1 + pit ∈ {ΠL,ΠH} the gross
8Technically, we first estimate a two-state Markov process for inflation and then impose the constraint that the
inflation series generated by our model be consistent with the estimated process. We can then recover the underlying
process for money growth that has generated the equilibrium response of inflation. Calibrating a two state Markov
process for money growth rather than would result in inflation overshooting following regime changes and would
thereby overestimate actual inflation risk.
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inflation rate between date t− 1 and date t. In real term, the quantity of newly issued money can
be expressed as:
∆t/Pt = γtPt−1Ωst−1/Pt = γtΩ
s
t−1/Πt, (11)
and the dynamics of total real money balances by:
Ωst = (1 + γt) Ω
s
t−1/Πt. (12)
Second, given Ωst−1 and current gross inflation Πt (∈ {ΠL,ΠH}) we determine γt so that Ωst
clears the money market (i.e., so that (9) holds), given aggregate money demand (which is a function
of the aggregate state, including the inflation factor Πt).
It is assumed that the newly issued money is given to the government as part of its resources.
This assumption captures the fact that in practice money is created by open market operations
which, once the budget of the government and the Central Bank are consolitated, are effectively
transfers to the government (see, e.g., Walsh, 2010, chapter 5). Our specification allows us to
incorporate spending and taxes without introducing public debt as a third asset, and thereby to
keep the model within the current computational limits. Under this monetary/fiscal arrangement
the budget of the government is balanced in every period and such that:
Gt = γtΩ
s
t−1/Πt + τ
l
twtn¯+ τ
c
t rtKt,
We assume that Gt = G > 0 is constant over time and then let the tax rates on capital and labor
adjust to satisfy the government budget constraint in every period. This ensures that inflation risk
does not generate wealth effects “in the aggregate” (which would somewhat artificially amplify the
welfare cost of inflation fluctuations). For simplicity we assume that the ratio of the two taxes
ψ = τ ct /τ
l
t is constant over time, so that the taxes on labor and capital are given by, respectively:
τ lt =
G− γtΩst−1/Πt
wtL+ ψrtKt
, τ ct = ψτ
l
t .
2.7 Recursive problem and equilibrium
We are considering a recursive equilibrium in which the aggregate state, which includes the ag-
gregate stock of capital, changes over time. Note that the way we have specified monetary policy
implies that households need not keep track of the aggregate money supply, because inflation (the
inverse of the return on money) enters as an exogenous forcing term here (with the rate of money
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growth adjusting to make a particular inflation path happen). It follows that the recursive problem
of a household can be written as:
v (at, et;pit,Kt) = max
mt,ct,kt+1
u (ct,mt) + βEt [v (at+1, et+1;pit+1,Kt+1) |et, pit] , (13)
subject to (4)–(5). Following Krusell and Smith (1998) and much of the subsequent literature, we
posit that households are able to successfully forecast the dynamics of the endogenous aggregate
state Kt by means of (log-) linear laws of motion (one per value of the exogenous aggregate state
pit) involving Kt and Ω
s
t :
ln (Kt+1) = b1(pit) + b2(pit) ln (Kt) + b3(pit) ln (Ω
s
t ) . (14)
The solution to (13) produces individual decision rules for consumption as well as holdings of
real balances and claims to the capital stock, which we denote by gc(at, et;pit,Kt), gm(at, et;pit,Kt)
and gk(at, et;pit,Kt), respectively. The law of motion of the distribution for beginning-of period
total wealth is denoted by H. For a given set of individual policy rules, this law of motion can be
written as
µt = H(µt−1, pit),
i.e., the cross-sectional distribution of wealth µt depends on its value in the previous period µt as
well as the current realization of the exogenous aggregate state pit.
Definition of the recursive equilibrium. A recursive equilibrium is defined by a law of motion
H, a set of optimal individual policy functions and value function {gc, gm, gk, v}, a set of price
functions {pi, r, w}, and a law of motion for K such that:
1. Given {pi, r, w}, the law of motion for Kt and the transition matrices F and T , the policy
functions {gc, gm, gk} solve the household’s problem;
2. The money and capital markets clear;
3. The law of motion of H is generated by the optimal decisions {gc, gm, gk}, and the transition
matrices F and T .
We solve for the recursive equilibrium using the same approach as in Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998). However, rather than using Monte Carlo simulations to generate an updated cross-sectional
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distribution, we use the grid-based simulation procedure proposed by Young (2010), which keeps
track of the mass of households at a fine grid of wealth levels. This allows us to get rid of the cross-
sectional sampling variations in the Monte Carlo simulation procedure. A detailed description of
the algorithm is provided in the Appendix.
3 Parameterization
Table 1: Parameter values
Preferences λ 1.00 Production α 0.360
β 0.99 δ 0.025
ρ 20.00 n¯ 0.300
ω 0.06
θ 0.21
Productivity el 3.940
em 0.849
eh 0.213
pil,l 0.975
pim,m 0.992
Table 1 reports the parameters of the model. The time period is a quarter. Following Chari et
al. (2000), our benchmark value for the utility parameter λ is 1. The capital share is set to α = 0.36,
and the depreciation rate to 0.025. Finally, labor supply is constant for all households and set to
0.3. The individual productivity states and the transition probabilities across states are calibrated
as follows. Following Domjei and Heathcote (2004), we use a Markov chain with three states, zero
probabilities to transit between extreme states (i.e., Fh,l = Fl,h = 0), and an equal probability to
reach any of the extreme states when in the intermediate state (i.e., Fm,h = Fm,l). The transition
matrix is then fully identified once Fl,l, Fm,m and Fh,h are set, and we set Fl,l = Fh,h = 0.9750,
Fm,m = 0.9925. Finally, the ratios of productivity levels are set to e
h/em = 4.64 and em/el = 3.99.
This process yields an autocorrelation of the real wage equal to 0.91 and a standard deviation of
the innovation term equal to 0.22 at annual frequency, in line with the data.
Table 1 also provides the preference parameters that best match key targets such as the Gini
of the money distribution; the money to GDP ratio; the interest rate elasticity of money; and
the capital-output ratio. The monetary aggregate we use is M1. It is measured as the quantity
of money in checking accounts in the Survey of Consumer Finances. The Gini coefficient of this
11
distribution is as high as 0.85. Broader monetary aggregates have similar dispersion (Ragot, 2014),
but the narrow aggregate that we use is more conservative. The quartely value of money over GDP
over the 1982-2005 period is 0.32.
We model the dynamics of monetary conditions between 1982Q1 and 2005Q4 as a two-state,
first-order Markov chain. More specifically, we estimate this chain using CPI-inflation and extract
the inflation levels that prevail in the ‘high-inflation’ versus ‘low-inflation’ regimes, as well as
the probabilities to transit between those regimes. This gives piL = 0.64%, piH = 1.17%, and
probabilities to stay in the same state Pr
(
piL|piL) = 0.944 and Pr (piH |piH) = 0.889.
We specify the fiscal policy parameters G and ψ as follows. According to Domeij and Heathcote
(2004), for the period 1990-1996 the capital income tax rate averaged 39.7 percent, while the labor
income tax rate averaged 26.9 percent. We thus set ψ = 39.7/26.9. Moreover, applying those rates
to a version of our model without aggregate risk (and with inflation equal to the unconditional
mean of inflation in the baseline model) gives G = 0.25 as a residual; we thus calibrate G to this
value in the baseline economy.
4 Results
4.1 Equilibrium distributions and laws of motion
We first check that our calibration reproduces the broad features of the US wealth distribution.
Unlike earlier studies, we seek to match the distributions of two components of total wealth: money
wealth and nonmonetary wealth. Given our focus on the portfolio structure chosen by the house-
holds, our empirical counterparts from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF 2004) are the
following. First, we report the empirical distribution of money across U.S. households, as measured
in households’ checking accounts. Second, we compute the distribution of nonmonetary wealth by
removing monetary assets from the financial assets held by the households in the SCF. Nonmon-
etary wealth refers to bonds, stocks, life insurance, retirement plans and other managed financial
assets, and other liquid assets. Table 2 compares the properties of those two distributions with
those generated by the model, under the parameter configuration specified in the previous section.
We also report the model-generated wealth distributions under homothetic period utility case, just
to illustrate its failure at getting anywhere close to the empirical distribution of monetary wealth.
Given our parametric utility function, all households hold some monetary assets in our model,
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even though the amount effectively held may be very small. However, many households are not
wealthy enough to hold both money and nonmonetary assets: they are borrowing-constrained and
endogenously choose not to hold capital claims.
The benchmark model predicts a fairly high Gini index for the distribution of nonmonetary
assets (0.81), as is consistent with the data (0.82). Moreover, the model does a reasonable job
in matching the lower tail of the distribution of nonmonetary assets. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
model underestimates the nonmonetary wealth share of the top 1%, which is predicted to be 9.03%
while it is 34.30% in the data. This flaw is common to many models that only use idiosyncratic
income risk to generate wealth dispersion and ignore, for example, entrepreneurship (see, e.g.,
Quadrini, 2000.)
Our model predicts that 6.6% of the households on average face a binding borrowing limit. The
range of available estimates for this share is notoriously large. Using information on the number of
borrowing requests which were rejected in the SCF, Jappelli argued that up to 19% of families are
liquidity-constrained. However, using updated SCF data, Budria Rodriguez et al. (2002) reported
that only 2.5% of the households have zero wealth, which might better correspond to our theoretical
borrowing limit.
Finally, we find the following laws of motion for the capital stock:
low inflation : lnKt+1 = 0.4723 + 0.7870 lnKt + 0.1140 ln Ω
s
t , R
2 = 0.9982.
high inflation : lnKt+1 = 0.4421 + 0.8085 lnKt + 0.1155 ln Ω
s
t , R
2 = 0.9981.
Thus, just as in Krusell and and Smith (1998), we find the first-order moments of the distribu-
tions of capital and real balances to yield an almost perfect prediction of future capital (hence of
the return on capital claims).
4.2 Individual policy rules
Figure 1 displays the individual policy rules when the money growth rate is piL (the policy rules when
pi = piH have a very similar shape) and for the average levels of capital. The policy rules for total
wealth, nonmonetary assets, money and consumption are decomposed for each level of productivity
eh, em and el. For example, the third panel of Figure 1 reports the individual policy rules for
nonmonetary assets. The policy rule lies above the 45-degree line for the most productive household
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Table 2: Wealth distribution
Data Homothetic utility∗ Nonhomothetic utility∗
Distribution of nonmonetary assets
Gini 0.82 0.74 0.81
Share of constrained households [2.5%, 20%] 8.76% 6.6%
Fraction of total asset held by
Bottom 20% 0.00 0.03 0.12
Bottom 40% 0.20 0.08 0.26
Top 20% 84.70 76.85 78.22
Top 10% 71.20 51.68 52.89
Top 1% 34.30 8.68 9.03
Distribution of money holdings
Gini 0.85 0.31 0.81
Fraction of total money held by
Bottom 20% 0.001 12.50 0.84
Bottom 40% 0.90 23.50 1.66
Top 20% 88.20 41.33 87.69
Top 10% 78.10 24.62 67.34
Top 1% 33.0 3.39 15.55
Capital/GDP 12.00 10.26 10.37
Money/GDP 0.32 0.33 0.32
∗ The model properties are averages over a 10,000 period simulation.
(with productivity eh) and below the 45-degree line for the other two types (with productivity em
or el). This implies that the former accumulate nonmonetary assets for self-insurance purposes
whereas the latter dis-save to smooth individual consumption. For medium- and low-productivity
households, the policy rule displays a kink at low levels of wealth; this is because at such wealth
levels these households hold money but no nonmonetary assets. The second and fourth panels show
the policy rules for money holdings and consumption, which roughly display the same pattern
as the policy rule for nonmonetary assets. The more productive the household (holding wealth
constant), or the wealthier the household (holding productivity constant), the higher are individual
consumption and money holdings. The close connection between the policy rules for consumption
and money holdings stems from the complementarity between the two, a direct implication of our
assumed nonhomothetic utility function.
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4.3 Welfare
We now evaluate the welfare cost of inflation fluctuations within our incomplete-market economy.
We do so by performing ex ante welfare comparison conditional on a particular value of the indi-
vidual state vector (productivity and wealth). The benchmark that we use for comparison is an
economy without inflation risk, where the inflation rate is constant and equal to the unconditional
mean of inflation (as computed from the baseline model with inflation risk). We wish to understand
who are the losers (or winners) from fluctuating inflation and thus proceed as follows.
First, we compute the ergodic distribution of households over productivity e and beginning-
of-period wealth a generated by our baseline model, and extract from the ergodic distribution
the average beginning-of-period wealth over all households (denoted by a¯) as well as the corre-
sponding averages for low-, medium- and high-productivity households (denoted by al, am and ah,
respectively).
Second, we compute the ex ante welfare of typical households in the baseline economy. For
example, to compute the ex ante welfare of a low-productivity (i.e., el) household, we first compute
his ex post intertemporal welfare (
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (ct,mt)) under a particular history of idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks after date 0, letting him start his life with the average portfolio of households with
similar productivity (i.e., al). We then repeat the same computation for ten thousands productivity
histories, but under the same initial conditions (a and e) and history of aggregate shocks. Averaging
over all idiosyncratic histories then gives us the ex ante welfare of this typical household (i.e.,
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (ct,mt)). We perform similar conditional welfare computations for the typical medium-
(em, am) and high-productivity (eh, ah) households. To broaden the picture, we also compute the
ex ante welfare of medium-productivity households (em) starting his life with the typical portfolio
of a high- or a low-productivity household (ie. al or am). This would be the ex ante welfare level of
a household who would have just transited into the medium-productivity class, after having stayed
highly (or little) productive for a while. We also compute the ex ante welfare levels by initial
productivity types for households starting their life with the economywide average beginning-of-
period wealth a¯.
The welfare cost of inflation fluctuations, expressed in terms of equivalent life-time proportional
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consumption loss, is then calculated by finding the δ such as the following equality is satisfied:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
δgc(at, et; p¯i, K¯), gm(at, et; p¯i, K¯)
)
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (gc(at, et;pit,Kt), gm(at, et;pit,Kt))
where the left hand side of the equation is the ex ante welfare in the benchmark economy without
aggregate inflation shocks, i.e., wherein inflation and capital stay constant at the unconditional
mean inflation rate p¯i and capital stock K¯ of the baseline model (using the same individual histories
as in the economy with inflation risk). In table 3 we report the welfare costs of inflation 1− δ (%).
For example, for a currently mid-productivity household (em) holding the typical portfolio of this
category (am), switching from the constant-inflation benchmark to an economy with inflation risk
is as costly as staying in the constant inflation economy but experiencing a permanent 1.23 percent
drop in individual consumption.
Table 3: The welfare cost of inflation risk (%)
Productivity Initial wealth Welfare cost∗
eh ah −0.36
em ah −0.80
em am 1.23
em al 1.77
el al 1.24
eh a¯ 0.87
em a¯ 0.89
el a¯ 0.93
∗The welfare costs are averages over a 10,000 productivity histories, but under the same
initial conditions (ex, ax) and history of aggregate shocks.
Differentiating households by productivity types only – that is, considering the welfare loss
of individuals with different beginning-of-life productivity – but holding the same initial wealth –
the economywide average a¯ – illustrates the fact that on average individuals tend to suffer from
inflation fluctuations, with an equivalent permanent consumption loss close to 1%.
Importantly, the welfare cost of inflation fluctuations that we find are very unevenly distributed
across households. In particular, while most households incur large welfare losses (up to 1.77% of
permanent consumption), the most productive and/or wealthy households incur no loss or even a
gain. Such is the case both for the typical high-productivity individual (starting with the average
wealth of individuals with same productivity, ah) and for a medium-productivity household having
been lucky enough in the past to have accumulated ah. To understand why this is the case, one
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must bear in mind how inflation risk affects households’ utility under our preference specification.
More specifically, the impact of inflation risk on individual welfare can be traced back to two effects:
a direct effect due to fluctuations in the marginal utility of money holdings, and an indirect effect
working through the distribution of aggregate capital income across households. The first effect
implies that inflation risk, which mechanically generates volatility in real money holdings, hurts
all households holding cash (since utility is concave in real balances). The second effect is related
to the complementarity between money and consumption. Because the marginal utility of real
balances is concave and consumption and real balances are complement, an increase in the volatility
of future real money balances (as implied by greater inflation risk) lowers the average marginal
utility of future consumption and hence discourages current savings.9 This is true for all types of
savings, including holdings of capital claims, and for all households, i.e., at all productivity levels.
Hence, inflation risk lowers the capital stock and raises the return on capital claims, which tilts
the distribution of total capital income towards high-productivity households (who holds greater
capital holdings on average). Indeed, the quarterly after-tax rates of return on capital claims are
or average 0.60% and 0.59% in the high and the low inflation states of the baseline economy,
respectively, while the same return is time-invariant at 0.55% in the economy without inflation
risk. The indirect effect turns out to (mildly) dominate the direct effect for high productivity
or mid-prodictivity/high wealth households, so that they ultimately benefit from inflation risk in
equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
Existing analyses of the welfare cost of fluctuations in general equilibrium (i.e., with endogenous
consumption) have focused on the impact of business cycles driven by real factors, namely changes
in total factor productivity and/or the extent of idiosyncratic income risk. As far as we are aware,
our analysis is the first one that explicitely examines the welfare impact of another key source of
aggregate fluctuations, namely, inflation risk. In so doing, we have used the simplest monetary
framework (i.e., Sidrauski’s MIU, flexible price model), combined with the assumption that house-
9Note that the lower future average marginal utility of consumption is accompanied by a greater volatility of
future marginal utility of consumption. Since the marginal utility of consumption is convex at all levels of real
balances, a “prudence” effect will limit, but not overturns, the impact of inflation risk on the average marginal utility
of consumption (formally, the impact of prudence on current consumption-saving choices operates at one order of
magnitude below the effect due to the complementarity between consumption and money).
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holds face uninsured idiosyncratic income risk (in the tradition of Bewley, Hugget, Aiyagari and
Krusell and Smith). We have then used the moments of the empirical cross-sectional distribution
of monetary assets to discipline preferences towards money and consumption goods, which led us
to adopt the nonhomothetic preference structure. Our main result is that a moderate amount of
inflation risk (i.e., of magnitude equal to its empirical measure over the Volcker to pre-Great Re-
cession period) generates substantial welfare losses for the average households (about one percent
of permanent consumption), and is most harmful for households towards to the lower end of the
distribution of income and wealth.
A Numerical Algorithm
A.1 Overview of the Algorithm
The algorithm used to obtain the solution of the model is as follows.
1. Given the law of motion for capital, defined by (14), solve the individual problem given by
equations (4), (5), (13), with kt+1 > 0.
10
2. Simulate the economy to approximate the equilibrium law of motion for K. We use the
grid-based simulation procedure proposed by Young (2010).
(a) Set an initial wealth/employment-efficiency distribution µ0 (a, e) that provides p
i,e
0 , i.e.
the mass of agents of employment-efficiency type e with wealth ai at the ith wealth grid
point for, i = 1, · · · , Ngrid.
(b) Given individual decision rules gk(at, et;pit,Kt) and gm(at, et;pit,Kt) found in step 1, the
wealth/employment-efficiency distribution µ (at, et), and a draw for pit, compute∫
gm(at, et;pit,Kt)dµ (at, et) = Mt
and ∫
gk(at, et;pit,Kt)dµ (at, et) = Kt+1
c. Repeat steps (b) and (c) to get a long time series for K and M , of which the first part
is discarded.
10The next sub-section describes the algorithm.
19
3. Use the time series obtained in step (2) to get the new equilibrium law of motion for K.
4. Compare the new equilibrium law of motion for K with that used in step (1). If they are
similar, stop. Otherwise, update the coefficients of the laws of motion, and go to step (1).
A.2 Details on the Resolution of the Individual Problem
We solve the individual problem defined by the following FOC:
uc (ct,mt)− um (ct,mt) = βEt
[
va (at+1, et+1;pit+1,Kt+1)
1 + pit+1
]
(15)
uc (ct,mt) = βEt
[(
1 +
(
1− τ ct+1
)
rt+1
)
va (at+1, et+1;pit+1,Kt+1)
]
if kt+1 > 0 (16)
and the budget constraint (4) by iterating on the derivative of the value function with respect to
a, va(.). We stop the iteration process if the new derivative of the value function is sufficiently
close to that in the previous step. Otherwise, we update va(.) with the new derivative of the value
function.
We have two distinct cases, whether the demand for asset is constrained or not:
1) If kt+1 = 0, we solve equation (15) to get mt with ct = at +
(
1− τ lt
)
wtetn¯ −mt, knowing
va (at+1, et+1;pit+1,Kt+1) and Kt+1 from the aggregate law of motion.
2) If kt+1 > 0, we find the solution for gc, gm, gk, and va using nested bisection methods. First,
we solve for m and k given a certain level of consumption using equation (15) and the budget
constraint. Second, we solve equation (16) for c, where the m and k are given by the previous step,
knowing va (at+1, et+1;pit+1,Kt+1) and Kt+1 from the aggregate law of motion.
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